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Developments in digital technology open up vast opportunities for news organisations to 
create and distribute journalism in new ways. The process of journalistic investigation has 
changed too. The laptop and phone play as important a role in the life of an investigative 
reporter as the notebook once did. 
Contact with a source is now as likely to happen digitally as in person. We create vast tracts  
of data - from internet connection records to communications data – and this information can 
tell interested parties everything about a reporter, the story they’re pursuing, and the source 
they’re protecting.
But, while the process may have changed, we still tell the same kinds of stories: scrutinising 
those in power; exposing wrongdoing; and working in the public interest. Our journalism 
continues to rely on an ability to offer protection and anonymity for sources and 
whistleblowers. Evidence from sources lay behind our reporting of tax transgressions in the 
Panama Papers and behind enabling ex-footballers to tell their stories of abuse in the sports 
youth system.
I’m delighted that the Guardian has supported the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in 
analysing how technological advances expose journalists and their sources to interference by 
state actors, corporate entities or individuals. 
As this report sets out, it is imperative that we all continue to call on those in power to improve 
our legal framework on a number of fronts. At a time when journalistic protections are more 
important than ever, the UK Parliament has just passed an act that brings in one of the most 
draconian surveillance regimes anywhere in the world, with the Investigatory Powers Act.  
It enables law enforcement and agencies to access journalists’ data without the journalist  
ever knowing.
As we continue to press for more protections from policymakers, we must also do everything 
we can to help ourselves, embracing a new age of technology with care. Alongside our 
sources, we must continue to uncover the truth.
Katharine Viner 
Editor-in-chief, Guardian News and Media
Foreword
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4This	brief	reports	on	a	research	initiative	on	confidential	source	and	whistleblower	protection	
led by researchers at the Information Law and Policy Centre at the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies.	It	includes	the	findings	of	discussions	with	a	specialist	group	of	25	investigative	
journalists, representatives from relevant NGOs and media organisations, media lawyers and 
specialist researchers in September 2016.
Main	findings	
•  The UK Government has, in recent years, pursued a number of policies and legislative 
proposals that have substantially weakened protections for sources. Most urgently, these 
include the Investigatory Powers Act that has recently become law and the Digital Economy 
Bill currently being considered by Parliament.
•  Technological change means that journalists, freelancers and publications are faced with 
previously	unprecedented	difficulties	in	protecting	their	sources.	The	technological	
protections for sources have not kept pace with the ability of states and other actors to use 
technology to intercept or monitor communications.
•  Although a number of domestic and European legal protections exist for the protection of 
confidential	sources,	their	effectiveness	is	considerably	weakened	by	technology	that	
provides an easy route to information; and the use of covert powers to which journalists and 
sources may be oblivious.
•  Working investigative journalists and media lawyers, many with several decades of 
experience, are profoundly concerned about the growing technological and legal 
vulnerability	of	confidential	sources	including	whistleblowers,	the	protection	of	whom	is	
essential to the pursuit of responsible journalism in the public interest.
• There is a need to strengthen whistleblower protection legislation in the UK.
Summary
25 investigative journalists, representatives from relevant NGOs and media organisations, media lawyers and specialist researchers
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We recommend that policymakers and lawmakers:
	 1	 	Guarantee	that	the	Investigatory	Powers	Act	Codes	of	Practice	sufficiently	protect	
journalists and their anonymous sources, in ways compliant with the UK’s international 
human rights obligations. 
 2  Make certain that the judicial oversight regimes are designed and operate in way that 
sufficiently	protects	journalists	and	their	anonymous	sources.	
 3  Ensure that Part V of the Digital Economy Bill is amended, so that it does not criminalise 
appropriate disclosures by whistleblowers operating in the public interest.1
We recommend that journalists and news organisations:
 4 Review and strengthen policies on secure technology, source care and protection. 
	 5	 Review	how	journalists	engage	with	sources	that	wish	to	remain	anonymous.	
	 6	 	Offer	or	seek	training	on	working	with	confidential	sources	to	make	journalists	and	sources	
aware of the practicalities and limitations of source care and protection. 
We recommend that researchers and NGOs:
 7 Examine the merits of extending public interest defences for whistleblowers. 
 8 Analyse and see what can be learnt from whistleblowing legislation in other territories. 
	 9	 	Seek	adequate	definitions	of	journalism	and	journalists,	and	evaluate	whether	this	can	
help the drafting of source protection laws.
 10 Produce a public log of cases where source protection is breached, and in what ways.
Future plans
The authors of this report propose to:
•  Set up a mailing list for the group which convened to produce this report, to enable a rapid 
and well informed response to policy developments. 
•  Explore the possibility of future research and research impact funding to build on the 
findings	of	this	meeting	and	other	relevant	projects.		
•  Undertake further empirical research and provide periodic updates on the severity of the 
threat to source protection in 2017.
•  Encourage the formation of an all-party group in Parliament which would have the capacity 
to highlight and examine issues of source protection and related threats to public interest 
journalism.
• Add further resources to a project website page, where this report will be published. 
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This is a principle that is explicitly stated in the National Union of Journalists code of conduct. 
But achieving this has not always been easy. Recent technological developments have 
exacerbated	these	difficulties.	Increasingly,	journalists	have	become	aware	that	any	digital	or	
other direct contact with a source who wishes to remain anonymous can make keeping a 
promise	of	confidentiality	very	difficult;	it	may	not	be	practically	possible	given	the	technical	
tools and legal powers available to police and other authorities.2	These	difficulties	have	been	
brought into stark focus during contemporary debates about surveillance in the UK. 
Journalistic	sources,	and	journalists,	are	increasingly	vulnerable	to	being	identified	by	state	
agencies and other actors.
There	is	another	side	to	this	coin:	it	has	always	been	difficult	for	concerned	individuals	to	
report wrongdoing – whether to journalists or to others – from within organisations without 
attracting	unfair	retribution.	Digital	communication	technology	increases	these	difficulties,	
should	the	whistleblower	want	to	communicate	their	concerns	anonymously	or	confidentially	
to a journalist.
This is a multifaceted issue. There are a number of different types of risk that arise, and a 
range of different people who bear these risks. Legally, there are a variety of domestic and 
international laws that affect the position of contemporary whistleblowers, journalists, 
not-for-profit	campaigners	and	other	individuals	working	to	expose	information	in	the	public	
interest and to hold those with political, economic and commercial power to account. 
Moreover, it must be recognised that another facet of the issue is that not all journalistic 
outputs may be considered to be in the public interest when taken in isolation.
Within this context, researchers at the Information Law and Policy Centre3 convened a 
meeting	of	25	investigative	journalists,	representatives	from	relevant	NGOs	and	media	
organisations, media lawyers and specialist researchers.
The meeting on 16th September 2016 was held at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in 
London under Chatham House Rules, with the support of the policy team at Guardian News 
and Media. This brief summarises the main points made by different participants at the 
meeting, and in light of the views expressed the authors offer recommendations for changes 
that are deemed necessary to assist the protection of sources in digital environments. It is 
divided into four sections: the legal framework, practical considerations, technological factors, 
and possible initiatives. 
Background
2 See, for example, Mark Pearson (2015): http://theconversation.com/how-surveillance-is-wrecking-journalist-source-confidentiality-43228. 3 http://bit.ly/infolawpolicy. 
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by Gillian Phillips, head of editorial legal at The Guardian, which she had prepared for the 
European University Institute.4 This was supplemented by a more detailed account, which was 
provided orally at the meeting by Gillian Phillips and Andrew Scott, Associate Professor in Law 
at the London School of Economics and co-author of Newsgathering: Law, Regulation, and 
the Public Interest (OUP, 2016). 
The account at the meeting started by identifying the core statement of principle on source 
protection set out in section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (CCA 1981). This installs a 
default,	although	qualified,	rule	that	journalists’	sources	and	materials	will	be	protected	as	a	
matter of law. (The complementary statute relevant to considerations of the protection of 
individuals who disclose public interest information (whistleblowers) is the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998 – PIDA 1998). Section 10 CCA 1981 was – arguably at least – an advance 
on the common law that came before it. But in practical legal terms, it has by now been 
subsumed within article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which 
guarantees freedom of speech. This, of course, has been incorporated into English law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
The leading case on article 10 in this context is Goodwin v UK.5 This holds, amongst other 
things, that: 
'protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom… without 
such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on 
matters of public interest… the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined 
and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely 
affected… such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is 
justified	by	an	overriding	requirement	in	the	public	interest'.	
However, these words have been honoured more in the breach, rather than in the observance, 
in UK case law, as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have repeatedly found that 
British judges are all too ready to afford access to journalistic sources. 
The legal bases on which British judges afford such access varies. Different laws are relevant, 
depending on whether it is the state that is seeking information from a journalist, or whether 
the	information	is	being	sought	by	private	individuals.	Perhaps	the	most	significant	for	private	
individuals is the power the court has to make Norwich Pharmacal orders.6 When granted, 
these place a journalist (or any other party mixed up in the tortious act of others) under a duty 
to	assist,	by	providing	information	–	including	the	identification	of	an	alleged	wrongdoer	–	to	a	
claimant.7 A claimant can, therefore, ask a court to use this power to disclose the identity of a 
source,	where	it	is	asserted	that	the	source	has	–	for	example	–	broken	the	duty	of	confidence	
he or she owes to the claimant, by providing a journalist with information. According to a 
participant with expertise in this area, there had not been any cases where the rights of the 
individual to disclose the information under PIDA have been expressly tested as against 
these powers. 
4 http://bit.ly/sourceprotection. 5 (1996) 22 EHRR 123. 6 Norwich Pharmacal co v Customs & Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133. 7 See, for example, The Rugby 
Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Limited (formerly Viagogo Limited) [2012] UKSC 55. 
The legal 
framework 
for source 
protection 
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protection for sources under  
UK law. Nevertheless, the 
protection under PACE for 
excluded (i.e. confidential) 
source material is reasonably 
strong, and, while PACE 
safeguards for ‘special 
procedure’ material are 
weaker, they were said  
to work.
Where it is the state that is seeking information, some of the most important laws include the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE, ss 9, 11, 13, 14 and sch 1), the Terrorism Act 
2000	(TA,	s	37	and	sch	5,	para	5	and	6),	the	Criminal	Justice	Act	1987	(s	2),	the	Inquiries	Act	
2005	(s	21)	and	the	Financial	Services	and	Markets	Act	2000	(s	13).	Each	of	these	statutes	
sets out the circumstances in, and the purposes for, which a state authority can obtain 
information. This is not a comprehensive list. 
The structures created by these acts are an attempt to balance competing interests, namely 
those of the sources seeking anonymity, a journalist seeking to protect the source, and the 
legitimate interests of the state in seeking information for the purposes of policing, and 
administrating justice. For example, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) 
includes rules for accessing journalistic material, i.e. content. It differentiates journalistic 
material	from	other	information	and	classifies	it	as	‘special	procedure	material’	or	‘excluded	
material’	depending	on	whether	it	is	held	under	a	duty	of	confidence.	Schedule	1	provides	
access criteria for special procedure material. Excluded material cannot normally be 
accessed under PACE (para 3 of sch 1 comprises a savings clause for earlier legislation 
under	which	excluded	material	could	be	obtained,	for	example	the	Official	Secrets	Act	1920).	
Such journalistic material may also be acquired via terrorism-related legislation such as the 
Terrorism Act 2000, which provides for access to both categories of information. Both PACE 
and	the	TA	contain	‘access	conditions’	including	whether	the	material	would	be	in	the	public	
interest to disclose, but judicial discretion is also relevant and ECHR Article 10 can be taken 
into account.
PACE focuses on protecting content: there is no absolute protection for sources under UK law. 
Nevertheless,	the	protection	under	PACE	for	excluded	(i.e.	confidential)	source	material	is	
reasonably	strong,	and,	while	PACE	safeguards	for	‘special	procedure’	material	are	weaker,	
they were said to work. The protections from disclosure where the Terrorism Act bites, 
however,	are	weaker	still.	What	is	important,	though,	is	that	even	these	qualified	protections	
have been undermined in contemporary times, and concerns about the ability to protect 
journalistic sources from the state are becoming more acute. This is because, as will be seen 
from the subsequent discussion, these delicate balances risk being crushed by contemporary 
technological and legal developments. 
In practice, the rulings of the ECtHR combined with domestic law, provide a list of substantive 
and procedural factors that need to be taken into account by a court, when deciding whether 
to permit disclosure of a journalists’ source. The substantive factors include:
•  the extent of the proposed interference with freedom of speech
•  general and particular public interests at stake in dissemination of the sources’ information 
to the public
•  objectives said to justify disclosure
•  the motive and conduct of source
•  the journalist’s conduct
•	 	whether	confidentiality	was	expressly	promised	to	the	source
•  other rights of the journalists, sources and third parties.
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v The Netherlands, include:8
•  the measure in issue should have some basis in domestic law
•  there must have been effective legal procedural guarantees for the journalist
	 •	 	the	first	and	foremost	of	these	is	the	guarantee	of	review	by	a	judge	or	other	independent	
and impartial decision making body
 •  any review must be in advance of access to the information sought. In Sanoma, the 
ECtHR	said	that	a	subsequent	review	would	‘undermine	the	very	essence	of	the	right	to	
confidentiality’.	Such	a	view	was	reinforced	in	the	case	of	Telegraaf Media v The 
Netherlands9
•	 	the	action	must	be	necessary	for	the	attainment	of	the	specified	purpose
	 •	 such	a	purpose	must	be	specific	and	clearly	identified
 •  the applicant must produce evidence of the importance of the objective being pursued, 
and how that will be advanced by disclosure
 •  there must be no alternative means by which the purpose for which disclosure is sought 
might be achieved.
There	was	then	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	some	specific	UK	powers,	and	the	extent	to	
which they were compliant with article 10. Attention was paid to the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000), which at the time of the meeting provided the main UK legal 
framework governing the acquisition and disclosure of content and communications data. 
RIPA enables intelligence and security agencies, police, customs and other public agencies 
to access communications data from telecoms companies for a variety of purposes. 
Part I chapter I allows for the interception of communications - i.e. content. Part I chapter II 
allows for access to communications data through service providers10 and Part II creates 
(amongst other things) an authorisation defence for covert surveillance by public authorities 
(following,	filming	etc.	in	public	places).	Intrusive	surveillance	(probes	in	houses	or	cars	etc.)	
requires prior judicial authorisation, and is only available for the investigation of serious (as 
defined)	crime.	Part	III	of	the	Police	Act	1997	deals	with	state	interference	with	property,	such	
as planting a bug or installing wireless telegraphy.
There	is	no	specific	mention	made	or	protection	in	RIPA	itself	for	confidential	journalistic	
material. A new Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice under 
RIPA	became	effective	from	25	March	2015	and	introduced	‘enhanced	safeguards’	to	protect	
the Article 10 rights of journalists.11	Effectively,	this	provides	that	where	confidential	journalistic	
material is likely to be obtained, processes under PACE should be used, so that prior judicial 
approval is normally required. However, it subsequently became apparent that a number of 
police forces had used the communications data route under RIPA to go directly to 
telecommunications companies for source-related data, thereby effectively circumventing the 
PACE protections. 
8 Application No. 38224/03 [2010] ECHR 38224/03. 9 Application No. 39315/06 [2012] 34 BHRC 193. 10 This was the subject of a case at the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal, brought by Tom Newton Dunn, Anthony France and Craig Woodhouse: News Group Newspapers Ltd and others v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 
[2015] UKIPTrib 14/176/H. 11 Paras 3.78 to 3.84. 
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Indeed,	in	February	2015,	the	Interception	of	Communications	Commissioner	Sir	Anthony	
May	found	that	the	then	current	Home	Office	rules	for	using	RIPA	did	not	‘provide	adequate	
safeguards to protect journalistic sources’. Consequently, a revised Code of Practice for the 
Interception of Communications Data was issued in January 2016.12
As well as article 10, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on article 8 – the right to a private life 
–	is	relevant,	and	was	discussed.	A	central	early	case	was	identified	as	Klass v Germany.13 
The	case	confirmed	that	state	interception	or	surveillance,	under	article	8(2),	could	be	
legitimate if it is in accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society, and 
proportionate.	But	the	court	noted	that	‘the	individual	will	necessarily	be	prevented	from	
seeking an effective remedy of his own accord or from taking a direct part in any review 
proceedings’. That means that, for any interception or surveillance to be compliant with 
article 8, the supervision of state powers in this context must be adequate to compensate for 
this absence of individual oversight through the courts. 
This case, and other jurisprudence of the European Court, meant that legislation was 
required to ensure that UK law complied with article 8 of the ECHR. As with the general 
powers of the security services and special police powers, the use of interception and 
surveillance powers could not be left without a statutory basis in the UK. Such legislation 
included	the	Interception	of	Communications	Act	1985,	the	Security	Service	Act	1989,	Part	
III of the Police Act 1997, and – indeed – the RIPA 2000 itself.
Furthermore,	specific	principles	can	be	garnered	from	the	ECtHR	jurisprudence	about	the	
nature of this legislation, and what it must contain to comply with article 8:
• legislation authorising surveillance must be clearly and carefully drafted
• surveillance must be reviewed and accompanied by procedures guaranteeing rights
•  it is desirable for a judge to supervise any relevant process, although other safeguards 
might	suffice,	provided	those	supervising	are	independent	and	can	exercise	effective	and	
continuous control
•  outside the most exceptional circumstances, public authorities must obtain authorisation in 
advance to undertake surveillance.
Article 8 and article 10 of the ECHR can combine together, and set standards that the ECtHR 
indicates	should	apply	where	state	surveillance	is	undertaken	specifically	to	identify	sources.	
(This is not the case where the obtaining of journalistic information is incidental to other 
investigatory purposes.) Where this happens, and where surveillance is undertaken for such 
a purpose, the case of Telegraaf Media	(as	mentioned	above)	emphasises	that	a	‘review	post	
factum…	cannot	restore	the	confidentiality	of	journalistic	sources	once	it	is	destroyed’.14 
12 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/interception-of-communications-code-of-practice-2016. 13 Application No. 5029/71 [1978] ECHR 4, (1980) 2 EHRR 
214. 14 Application No. 39315/06 [2012] 34 BHRC 193.
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Concerns 
arising from 
the legal 
framework 
The investigative journalists, media lawyers and representatives of whistleblowers who were 
present raised a number of concerns about the law.
A general, overriding concern was that technology might have made some, many or even all 
of these legal protections for journalists and their sources redundant. This is because legal 
protection against disclosure and delivery up orders are irrelevant if surveillance, retention of 
and access to communications data, or interception of communications allows investigating 
authorities an easy route to information.
Moreover, legal protections may have become ineffective – if ever they were effective.  
This is because if covert powers are used, a journalist and source will not know this has 
occurred – intrusion may become apparent only if the material is used in legal proceedings 
(this is the point that was recognised in Klass.) In this scenario, the only protection can be a 
legal requirement that decision-makers properly weigh source/journalist Convention rights 
against any legitimate aims of investigation. It is very important indeed that they do so. 
Concerns about the Investigatory Powers Bill (IP Bill, since passed as the Investigatory 
Powers	Act),	set	out	by	Guardian	News	and	Media	in	a	briefing	earlier	this	year,	included	the	
fact that it does not allow for any prior notice to be given to media organisations, and that it 
does not provide the judicial commissioners making decisions on access to journalistic 
material with the power to request information from a news organisation when they require 
more information.
It was noted that examples of states using covert powers against journalists without journalists’ 
knowledge	were	easy	to	find.	They	include	targeted	hacking	of	journalists’	email	in	China;15 
the NSA targeting of journalists’ records;16 the US Attorney General’s obtaining of phone 
records of AP journalists in 2013,17 the police’s surveillance of the local newspaper journalist 
Sally Murrer in the UK under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA); and HMRC 
identification	of	a	whistleblower	under	RIPA.18 
Furthermore, a three-year review published by the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner’s	Office	(IOCCO)	in	2015	showed	that	over	240	journalistic	sources’	
communications data had been accessed between 2011 and 2014,19 although there may 
have been other unrecorded incidents as well. 
15 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/world/asia/31china.html?_r=0. 16 https://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-the-press-surveillance-storage.php. 17 http://ca.reuters.
com/article/topNews/idCABRE94C0ZW20130513. 18 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/mar/24/hmrc-criticised-mps-terror-law-tax-whistleblower-hodge. 
19 http://www.iocco-uk.info/docs/IOCCO%20Communications%20Data%20Journalist%20Inquiry%20Report%204Feb15.pdf, p.29. The report states that 242 
represents the maximum number of sources from 34 investigations reported by 19 police forces as there may be duplication. 
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Beyond that, a number of particular concerns about the law and legal environment were 
raised at the meeting.
•	 	A	first	specific	concern	was	that	Lord	Justice	Leveson	had	recommended	narrowing	the	
protection afforded to journalists, against whom the authorities were seeking orders for 
disclosure of material, under PACE 1984. This recommendation, if adopted, would make it 
more	difficult	to	protect	sources,	in	particular	because	it	could	narrow	the	category	of	
‘excluded	material’.
•	 	A	second	specific	concern	related	to	(what	is	at	the	time	of	writing)	clause	34	of	the	Digital	
Economy Bill, which – if passed as currently drafted – will create a new offence for sources 
disclosing and journalists publishing information shared between government departments. 
Again, source protection would suffer if this clause passed.20
•	 	A	third	specific	concern	related	to	the	propensity	of	confidentiality	clauses	–	for	example,	in	
employment contracts, dispute settlement contracts or procurement contracts – to deter 
sources from reporting their concerns. Particular mention was made of this in relation to the 
NHS,	where	the	use	and	abuse	of	confidentiality	clauses	has	attracted	some	scrutiny.	There	
is	protection	for	this	in	PIDA,	but	it	has	not	been	legally	tested	perhaps	because	it	is	difficult	
to	find	a	claimant	willing	to	spend	the	necessary	time,	energy	and	attention	on	the	issue	at	
the same time as risking their settlement award. Many whistleblowers understandably have 
other priorities, such as seeking employment, and getting on with their lives.
•	 	A	fourth	specific	concern	was	about	the	efficacy	of	whistleblowing	protections.	One	
participant argued that protections within PIDA 199821 needed strengthening. According to 
this specialist working with whistleblowers, PIDA has not been thoroughly reviewed by 
Government since it was enacted almost two decades ago and there is a real sense that 
this law is not working properly. There is a need for some strengthening provisions in the 
statute	as	well	as	some	areas	where	the	law	could	be	simplified.	Additional	problems	
include	access	to	employment	tribunals	becoming	more	difficult	with	cuts	to	legal	aid,	the	
introduction of fees and a creeping culture of costs. Given that these claims are often 
against employers with deep pockets more should be done by Government to protect 
whistleblowers who make public interest disclosures.
•	 	A	fifth	specific	concern	related	to	the	deficiencies	of	the	Investigatory	Powers	Bill,	being	
considered in Parliament at the time of the meeting and since passed by both houses in 
November 2016.
20 https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-2017/0045/17045.pdf. 21 http://www.pcaw.co.uk/law-policy/a-guide-to-pida. 
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In particular, it was said that the Bill does not comply with the requirements of article 8 of the 
ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR, discussed above. As it was put to the group by one legal 
expert:	‘Is	there	judicial	oversight	of	a	sort?	Does	the	IP	Bill	satisfy	article	10?	No	it	doesn’t’.
Such a view was supported by a human rights specialist, who said that the so-called 
protection in the Bill via an authorisation that has to be signed by a judicial commissioner is 
‘not	protection	at	all’.	Media	representative	groups	including	the	News	Media	Association,	the	
National Union of Journalists and the Media Lawyers Association have all made submissions 
to relevant Parliamentary committees on the Investigatory Powers Bill on this point.
Concern	has	also	been	raised	about	the	definitions	relating	to	journalism	and	journalistic	
activity which could be construed narrowly, and do not offer as much protection as the access 
requirements	of	PACE.	And,	as	well	as	the	clauses	relating	specifically	to	the	protection	of	
journalistic sources, areas of concern in the Bill included bulk personal datasets (BPD). It was 
suggested	by	one	investigative	journalist	that	‘risks	will	likely	extend	through	the	post	hoc	
legitimation and extension of BPD’.
A	participant	from	a	human	rights	organisation	also	discussed	the	ramifications	of	the	IP	Bill	
on the way in which sources may view journalists and the inability of journalists to offer 
confidentiality.	The	sources	may	feel	deterred	and	see	journalists	as	proxy	to	the	state	due	to	
their inability to protect sources.
While the IP Bill was of great concern to the group, views were divided on how much change 
could be made at a late stage of the Bill’s progression through Parliament. The Investigatory 
Powers Act became law on 29 November 2016. 
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Definitional 
difficulties 
While	the	discussion	did	not	linger	on	definitions,	or	explore	in	depth	the	well-trodden	ground	
of	who	constituted	a	‘journalist’	or	what	qualified	as	a	‘media	organisation’,	these	issues	of	
definition	were	recognised	by	participants	as	being	highly	important.	The	issues	here	relate	to	
who should be categorised as a journalist, as a source, as a whistleblower, and in general 
who merits protection and who does not.
Some	examples	of	the	difficulties	that	arise	in	practice	from	these	definitional	problems	were	
raised. One example relates to David Miranda, the partner of the (then) Guardian journalist 
Glenn Greenwald who was stopped and detained by the Metropolitan Police at Heathrow 
Airport in August 2013 under the Terrorism Act 2000. By assisting his partner’s journalistic 
activity,	was	David	Miranda	acting	as	a	journalist	or	a	whistleblower	or	a	source?	In	David 
Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home Department,22	the	Court	of	Appeal	found	that	‘stop’	
powers	under	Schedule	7	of	the	Terrorism	Act	2000	were	‘incompatible	with	article	10	of	the	
Convention in relation to journalistic material in that it is not subject to adequate safeguards 
against its arbitrary exercise’.23
Another example that was raised was the case of a junior journalist at the BBC's panorama 
programme	who	disclosed	confidential	information	about	a	journalistic	investigation	(amongst	
other things) 24 to the subject of that investigation, the politician Lutfur Rahman.25 Was this act 
whistleblowing,	which	should	be	protected,	a	breach	of	confidence	that	should	be	punished,	
or	a	citizen-journalist	acting	as	a	source	for	a	politician?	If	matters	turn	on	one’s	political	
perspective, rather than on a general rule, enormous problems can arise.
One	proposition	to	resolve	the	definitional	difficulties	was	to	argue	that	journalistic	source	
protection should be afforded to institutional journalists, and made as robust as legal 
professional privilege (LPP). 
LPP can be abused, and protection afforded for indefensible purposes, but such abuse of the 
privilege can be defended on the grounds that a rule is necessary to provide certainty and 
robustness. If such an argument works for lawyers, it was suggested, it could also work for 
journalists.
The	deficiencies	of	this	idea	were	discussed.	An	academic	researcher	was	firmly	of	the	view	
that it was inappropriate to offer protection of this sort only to institutional journalists. Part of 
the reason for such a view was that journalists frequently do not act responsibly. Also relevant, 
the researcher argued, was the risk of abuse by anonymous sources.
22 [2016] EWCA Civ 6. 23 Ibid, para. 119. 24 The information was reported to have also included highly sensitive information about a terrorism investigation: http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/exclusive-bbcs-panorama-team-loses-confidential-information-relating-to-a-secret-british-army-unit-9580340.html. 
25 http://www.bbc.co.uk/ariel/26834830.
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The implication was that risk of abuse in the case of journalistic source protection was much 
higher than for lawyers. The researcher implicitly argued that, unlike Legal Professional 
Privilege, the merits of disclosure should turn on the particular facts in a given case. To 
support this viewpoint, they mentioned the Valerie Plame affair in the US  in 2002-3.26 Here, 
anonymous	sources	from	the	Bush	administration	were	motivated	to	disclose	certain	classified	
information because of self-interested, partisan politics. The information that was provided 
was intended to discredit a retired diplomat, with whom the source in the Bush administration 
disagreed.
A response to this, later in the meeting, was that it might be appropriate to argue for stronger 
protection of journalistic sources and whistleblowers not by referring to journalists, or to the 
content in a particular case, but by emphasising the notion of the public interest in the 
existence of such a rule as a rationale.
A	difficulty	here,	though,	was	the	potential	weakening	of	any	case	for	strong	source	protection	
rules for institutional journalists. This is because the focus is again on the type of information 
– being in the public interest – rather than the type of rule as being in the public interest. So 
the question of whether a source is legitimately protected returns to the nature of the 
information, rather than the relationship. This bears the risk of returning the resolution of the 
question once again to questions of political preference. However, the meeting seemed to be 
of the view that this was a more appropriate way of framing how journalist source protection 
should be conceived.
One	specific	problem	was	raised	concerning	material	derived	from	confidential	sources	that	
related to libel trials. In libel cases in the UK, for example, the general position is that 
unnamed sources can be relied upon when advancing a defence. However, reliance on such 
sources can come at a cost, as they can be considered to have less evidential weight than 
attributed	material.	This	is	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	such	as	the	difficulties	that	arise	in	
assessing the provenance of the information and the motives of the source when their identity 
is not known. In the US, in some states there is a starker choice – to rely on the source, the 
source	will	have	to	be	identified.	But	where	the	judgment	is	that	a	source’s	identity	should	not	
be	released,	that	will	mean	that	it	will	be	more	difficult	to	defend	a	libel	action,	as	their	
evidence may not be admissible in a trial. 
26 See, for example, Valerie Plame Wilson, Secrets and Spies, Index on Censorship, Autumn 2016:  https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2016/09/does-anonymity-
need-to-be-defended-autumn-magazine-2016/
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Two	other	legal	issues	identified	during	the	meeting	involved	the	question	of	the	ownership	of	
particular journalistic information.
One	related	to	notebooks	and	other	journalistic	records.	‘Who	owns	these?’,	it	was	asked.	
Whereas notebooks are clearly the journalists’ own, emails sent from work email accounts 
belong to the organisation, which means that the journalist has less control over access to 
their content. Ownership of the information (or practically speaking, possession of the manner 
or material in which the information has been recorded) is important it was argued. This is 
because in practice there are different consequences when information is sought from a 
journalistic organisation, or when it is sought from an individual journalist. If disclosure is 
sought from an organisation but an individual journalist owns (or practically speaking, holds or 
possesses) the material in question, then even if the organisation may eventually succumb to 
financial	or	legal	pressures	to	hand	it	over,	the	journalist	can	still	stand	on	principle	and	refuse	
to hand it over. Moreover, it was argued that the employer cannot – or may not wish to – force 
them to do so. In practice this may be useful to bear in mind, if disclosure is sought from a 
journalistic organisation, where that organisation wishes to withhold information.
A second, and different issue, involves the question of who owns the metadata relating to 
journalistic communication. 
Neither the journalist, nor their employer, own this data. It is likely that it is owned by telecoms 
companies (or so one participant argued). This is important given the value of metadata in 
identifying sources (and, indeed, in identifying content). It amounts to an extra vulnerability 
that journalists face in attempting to protect their sources. They have no – or limited – control 
over the acquiescence with which telecoms providers respond to requests from governments 
for information that can disclose a source. This creates a weakness for those seeking to 
protect a source. 
The Investigatory Powers Act appears to have adopted this view – i.e. the Government 
contends that because communications data obtained from a telecommunications provider 
belongs to the provider and not a journalist or journalistic organisation, issues to do with 
journalistic sources are somehow irrelevant. 
Other legal 
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After the group had addressed the main legal concerns, the discussion turned to what 
happens in practice.
One issue arose from the account of the junior BBC Panorama journalist who disclosed 
information in the Lutfur Rahman case. This raised questions of access to information. There 
were practical questions that journalists and journalistic organisations need to address as to 
who should have access to what information, and under what conditions. An investigative 
journalist	said	it	was	inappropriate	for	interns	to	be	given	access	to	‘the	crown	jewels’.
Associated with this was the issue of investigators in non-traditional journalistic organisations 
– charities, and individuals. Such people might not have the appropriate structure and 
resources, or experience to investigate professionally, ethically, legally and safely. Moreover, 
they were thought much less likely to be able to deal robustly with bullying lawyers’ letters, 
sent to silence them, than established news companies. And, apposite to the current 
discussion, they may well not have given thought to how – and to what extent – they should 
protect	their	sources.	How,	it	was	asked,	‘can	you	spread	a	culture	of	protection?’
Somewhere between the two are freelancers, and non-traditional journalists such as bloggers. 
It is frequently unclear who, if anyone, bears professional responsibility for such people, when 
they are commissioned to undertake investigative work.
Connected to the points discussed above in relation to the Valerie Plame affair, the motivations 
of whistleblowers and sources who seek anonymity were discussed. Some can be mischief-
makers, and others may have an axe to grind. Responsible investigative journalists need to 
establish the motivations of their sources, and be alive to the fact that these may change. An 
investigative journalist described how early on in the conversation with a source, a journalist 
should	act	‘like	a	family	doctor’,	and	take	a	case	history.
Conversely, many whistleblowers have taken great risks, and have undergone an exhausting 
process, to get to the stage of approaching a journalist. This needed to be taken into account, 
and indeed it was important for a journalist to be aware of the needs of a source, and to think 
hard about the extent to which such needs could be met – and their anonymity protected. 
Moreover, a journalist should ensure that a whistleblower understands what may result from 
their actions. Journalists should be aware of the psychological impact on sources, and not 
only	focus	on	technical	and	legal	risks.	Specific	training	on	source	relations	and	support	
would be helpful here. 
Questions raised by participants that related to source protection included: What does 
protection	mean	in	practice?	How	far	do	journalists	go	with	sources?	Do	you	provide	a	source	
with	a	house	if	they	lose	their	job?
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It was suggested by a participant working with whistleblowers that news organisations should 
think about their rights and duties to whistleblowers. One area of potential action would be the 
introduction of a public interest defence for whistleblowers, which would extend beyond 
employment-related protections. This could help a whistleblower in their decision to share 
information. There was criticism of the extent to which the current regime of whistleblowing 
was effective. A measure of greater protection might improve the position of those who wish to 
report a problem in the public interest. 
Importantly, it should be noted that an individual may not necessarily think of themselves as a 
‘source’	when	making	contact	with	a	journalist:	they	are	simply	sharing	information	about	their	
observations or experiences.
Guarantees of complete protection of anonymity were highly unlikely to be achievable in a 
digital era, it was agreed. Everyone leaves digital footprints, everywhere. One journalist 
recognised	that	‘everything’	they	wrote	down	could	be	accessible	in	some	way.	The	only	
safeguard was having face-to-face conversations.
An experienced investigative journalist described how perceived threats may in fact not be 
present,	but	the	perception	that	they	may	be	will	have	significant	impact	on	what	may	be	said	
or on what contact a source is ready to tolerate. Actual threats to sources may not be properly 
perceived.	Information	owners’	knowledge	of	‘who	knew	what’	may	often	be	more	important	
and effective than data potentially available from bulk data systems.
In other words, journalists should perform threat assessments while talking to sources,  
and also use these to ensure that they receive informed consent from the source, so that 
the source is clear that they know what they are getting into. There would be an important 
distinction as to whether the source is still employed in the workplace about which they are 
disclosing information. PIDA, which offers an employment-law related remedy to a 
whistleblower should they suffer workplace detriment, would be less useful in some 
circumstances – for example, if they are not seeking employment-related protection.  
One journalist made the point that there is a basic duty to protect communication with a 
source, even if the story falls through.
Others emphasised that, while a journalist should be straightforward and honest with a source 
about the risks, a balancing act was needed – as one journalist said, you do not want to 
‘spook	the	horses’.
There was an extensive discussion about the ethics of source protection. Where there was a 
legal compulsion to supply information to authorities, journalists would be presented with a 
moral	choice	as	to	whether	or	not	to	comply.	To	breach	the	confidentiality	of	a	source	would	
be	in	conflict	with	the	National	Union	of	Journalists	(NUJ)	and	other	industry	codes.	To	an	
extent, this was a well-trodden discussion.
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But the converse point was also raised. Some journalists may feel a moral obligation to 
provide information, even where there is no legal compulsion. This may occur when, for 
example, an investigation uncovers serious criminality. The journalist then has to make a 
judgement about whether to give evidence in a case. An investigative journalist said such 
dilemmas arise practically daily. 
Morally,	it	may	seem	clear	that	they	should.	But	this	leads	to	difficulties	down	the	line.	 
First,	when	a	journalist	begins	cooperation,	it	becomes	difficult	to	retreat	at	a	later	stage. 
A journalist – and an organisation – becomes boxed in.
Secondly,	cooperation	with	authorities	on	a	first	occasion	may	create	a	precedent,	which	
could	make	it	more	difficult	for	a	journalistic	organisation	to	resist	a	request	from	the	police	to	
comply	on	a	later	occasion.	It	is	easier	for	an	organisation	to	say	‘we	do	not	supply	material	
unless you get a court order compelling us to do so’. In practice, in other words, a journalist 
who hands material over or works with the authorities because they feel a moral obligation to 
do	so,	may	create	difficulties	on	other	occasions,	or	where	others	do	not	feel	so	obliged.
Particular practical concerns aligned to this arose in relation to terrorism investigations.  
One investigative journalist described how the duty to inform the authorities about certain 
information under s19 of the Terrorism Act 2000 results in a chill on investigative activity.  
He said that he has refrained from investigating material, because it could result in his having 
to inform the police, which could compromise his sources.
One personal vulnerability for journalists related to terrorism, occurred when police 
categorised journalists as domestic extremists. This has been revealed through work by 
the National Union of Journalists, and individual subject access requests under the Data 
Protection	Act.	If	journalists	are	categorised	as	such,	they	are	likely	to	find	their	activity 
is monitored.27 
27 https://www.nuj.org.uk/news/journalists-catt-challenge-extremism/.
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Throughout the discussion the group considered technological issues.
At a very basic level, questions were raised about the safety of secure online drop-box type 
systems that have been introduced by some organisations. Digital footprints were inevitable. 
Furthermore, one might not be aware of the full digital trail if intermediaries were involved. 
Jigsaw	identification	via	several	pieces	of	information	was	a	possibility.
Anonymous secure drop-box systems posed their own problems, it was said. They make it 
impossible,	or	very	difficult,	to	assess	the	motivations	and	provenance	of	material	derived	
from	them.	That	means	it	is	difficult	for	a	responsible	investigative	journalist	to	use	the	material	
delivered by them.
Related to this point was an issue of continuing and maintaining contact with a source, not just 
securing	the	first	point	of	contact.	OnionShare	was	mentioned	as	one	potentially	useful	tool.
Risk	assessment	was	identified	as	essential,	and	this	required	thinking	beyond	one	
investigation – if a journalist has material relating to different activity stored on a machine this 
is also vulnerable to hacking.
Concerns were raised about cryptography techniques, including the use of the encryption 
programme	Pretty	Good	Privacy	(PGP),	and	the	difficulties	of	doing	it	correctly.	PGP	was	
essential to Glenn Greenwald’s reporting of the Snowden revelations, but the appropriateness 
of information security methods will depend on a case by case analysis. There is a very 
important place for PGP but, as with all methods, it is not a silver bullet remedy.
At several points, it was suggested that old fashioned and pre-digital methods could still serve 
a purpose: e.g. receiving information by post, fax or hand-delivery.
It	was	suggested	that	journalists	could	advertise	online	when	they	will	be	in	the	office,	so	an	
individual	could	find	them	in	person	(this	would	not	necessarily	help	a	freelance	without	an	
office	base,	and	such	source-journalist	contact	could	still	be	vulnerable	to	surveillance	–	by	
tracking smart phone locations, for example).
The participant working with whistleblowers suggested that many people do not think about 
encryption. For a source, the main concern is going public, and if dealing with the media, to 
what extent they trust the journalist.
One	opening	presentation	suggested:	‘the	capability	to	tap	your	computer	or	phone	has	been	
decentralized and privatized… that power is potentially in the hands of a far wider group: 
people sharing [a] wireless network at a cybercafé can snoop on your instant messages… 
hackers can break into your email account; to minimise risks of state and private interference 
investigative journalists should always adopt appropriate data security protocols’.28  
Technological 
factors 
28 Smyth and O’Brien, CPJ Journalist Security Guide: Covering the News in a Dangerous and Changing World (New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012), 17. 
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For Policy Action
We recommend that policymakers and lawmakers:
 1  Guarantee that the Investigatory Powers Act Codes of Practice protect journalists and their 
anonymous sources. Now the Investigatory Powers Act is passed, ensure that the 
associated	Codes	of	Practice	sufficiently	protect	journalists	and	their	anonymous	sources,	
in ways compliant with the UK’s international human rights obligations.
 2  Make certain that the judicial oversight regimes are designed and operate in a way  
that	sufficiently	protects	journalists	and	their	anonymous	sources.	A	key	element	 
of the oversight regime will be the publication of regular reports on the usage of intercept 
requests. Policymakers should recognise that it is appropriate for media organisations to 
push for as much detail as possible in order to assess whether warrants are being misused.
 3  Ensure that Part V of the Digital Economy Bill is amended, so that it does not criminalise 
appropriate disclosures by whistleblowers operating in the public interest.  
The regime in Part V (clause 34) of the Digital Economy Bill would have the effect of 
criminalising any onward unauthorised disclosure of the information. The Media Lawyers 
Association	suggest	that	this	‘creates	new	and	anti-democratic	restrictions	on	how	that	
data can be treated by journalists, which would appear to seriously threaten (and gag) 
legitimate journalism’. Based on this analysis and the discussion at the meeting, it is 
recommended that this clause is re-drafted to ensure compatibility with article 10 of the 
ECHR, as required by law. 
For Journalists and News Organisations
We recommend that journalists and news organisations:
 4  Strengthen policies on secure technology, source care and protection. The Centre of 
Investigative Journalism has produced a useful resource in the form of an Information 
Security handbook.29 Organisations that support the work of journalists, including the 
National Union of Journalists, can also provide journalists with training and resources.  
Old fashioned and pre-digital methods could still serve a purpose, although these are not 
necessarily fail-safe: e.g. meeting in person, receiving information by post, fax or 
hand-delivery. They should also consider the position of self-employed freelancers who 
may be vulnerable to legal and technological threats.
	 5	 	Review	how	they	engage	with	sources	that	wish	to	remain	anonymous.	This	may	be	based	
on existing work in this area, including the Neil Report produced by the BBC.
	 6	 	Undertake	sufficient	training	on	source	protection.	Journalists	working	with	confidential	
sources should be given more training on the practicalities and limitations of source care 
and protection. Training should cover a range of factors: legal, technological and 
psychological, and should not only consider methods by which sources can be protected, 
but also the limitations of that protection. This should be communicated to any source to 
whom	confidentiality	is	promised.	This	type	of	training	should	also	be	offered	to	trainee	
journalists. Universities and other organisations offering journalism training should make 
such training an integral part of their courses. 
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For Researchers and NGOs
We recommend that researchers and NGOs:
 7  Examine the merits of extending public interest defences for whistleblowers. This research 
should consider public interest defences that extend beyond employment protection 
remedies,	and	into	the	law	of	confidence,	for	example.
 8  Analyse and see what can be learnt from whistleblowing legislation in other territories. 
Australia	and	Ireland	provide	examples	of	countries	with	specific	legislation	on	
whistleblowing. Mandatory procedures for whistleblowing could help facilitate and 
legitimise people in speaking up.
	 9	 	Seek	adequate	definitions	of	journalism	and	journalists.	These	remain	uncertain	in	law.	
In-depth analysis and research, both doctrinal and empirical, would inform the drafting of 
future	legislation	that	offers	specific	protections	for	journalistic	source	material.	Key	
questions include:
 •  Whether these protections that focus on protecting public interest activity should go 
beyond	journalists	to	investigative	not-for-profit	organisations	and	others.
 •  The viability of the argument that there should be a rule-based protection for journalistic 
source protection, analogous to that which exists for lawyers. This might be explained with 
reference to the public interest in such a rule existing.
 •  Whether it is better to adopt as a default position a case-by-case, ad hoc analysis, as to 
whether a source should be protected on the basis of whether the disclosure of that 
information was in the public interest.
	 •	 	Whether	there	are	viable	and	useful	definitions	of	‘news’,	‘journalism’	and	‘journalists’	that	
can be found in other areas of law or in other jurisdictions – for example, in copyright and 
defamation.
 10  Produce a public log of cases where source protection is breached, and in what ways. 
The discussion revealed a range of different experiences and responses to pressure from 
state authorities and agencies for source disclosure. Empirical research would assist in 
the following areas:
	 •	 	What	is	actually	happening?	Work	should	be	done	to	survey	and	interview	the	different	
actors involved in the process of whistleblowing, to gather data on the implications of 
different rules and approaches in practice.
	 •	 	How	can	it	be	categorised?	Work	should	be	done	to	evaluate	and	classify	the	nature	and	
type of material published and gathered as a result of anonymous sources, to assess the 
extent	to	which	this	material	could	be	seen	as	‘public	interest’	material,	however	that	might	
be	defined.	
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Future plans
The authors of this report propose to:
 •  Set up a mailing list to develop a rapid response group of informed people to respond to 
policy developments (such as new laws) affecting investigative journalism and source 
protection.
 •  Explore the possibility of future research and research impact funding. This would build on 
the	findings	of	this	meeting	and	other	relevant	projects.
 •  Undertake further empirical research and provide periodic updates on the severity of the 
threat to source protection in 2017.
 •  Encourage the formation of an all-party group in Parliament which would have the 
capacity to highlight and examine issues of source protection and related threats to public 
interest journalism. The House of Lords Committee on Communications report on the 
future	of	investigative	journalism	in	2012,	provided	a	welcome	–	albeit	fleeting	–	moment	of	
focus on the challenges facing journalists and the media organisations they work for. 
Many of the recommendations contained in the report have yet to be pursued. The 
establishment of an all-party group could act as a continuing forum for dialogue about the 
importance of investigative journalism, the need for strong source protection, and the 
challenges posed by government legislation.
 •  Add further resources to a project website page. This report would be published on this 
page, along with other materials. 
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